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Le service des relations publiques de Chavez "répond" à HRW. On notera la présence de Chomsky au nombre des signataires.

More Than 100 Latin America Experts Question Human Rights Watch's Venezuela Report

Experts Highlight Exaggerations and Inaccuracies in "Politically Motivated" Study

WASHINGTON - December 17 - In an open letter to the Board of Directors of Human Rights Watch, over 100 experts on Latin America criticized the organization's recent report on Venezuela, A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela, saying that it "does not meet even the most minimal standards of scholarship, impartiality, accuracy, or credibility." The signers include leading academic specialists from universities in the United States, including Harvard, Johns Hopkins, and a number of state universities, and academic institutions in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, México, the U.K., Venezuela and other countries. The letter cites Jose Miguel Vivanco, lead author of the report, saying "We did the report because we wanted to demonstrate to the world that Venezuela is not a model for anyone…"[1], as evidence of its political agenda. The letter also criticizes the report for making unsubstantiated allegations, and that some of the sources that Human Rights Watch relied on in the report are not credible.

"By publishing such a grossly flawed report, and acknowledging a political motivation in doing so, Mr. Vivanco has undermined the credibility of an important human rights organization," the letter states.

The letter notes that numerous sources cited in the report - including opposition newspapers El Universal and El Nacional, opposition group Súmate, and a mentally unstable opposition blogger - have been known to fabricate information, making it "difficult for most readers to know which parts of the report are true and which aren't." The letter also argues that the Human Rights Watch report makes sweeping allegations based on scant evidence. For example, its allegation of discrimination in government services is based on just one person whose nephew claimed she was denied medicine from a government program.

The full text of the letter follows:

December 16, 2008

Human Rights Watch 350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor

New York, NY 10118-3299 USA

To the Board of Directors,

We write to call your attention to a report published by Human Rights Watch that does not meet even the most minimal standards of scholarship, impartiality, accuracy, or credibility. The document, A Decade Under Chávez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela, appears to be a politically motivated essay rather than a human rights report. Indeed, the lead author of the report, Jose Miguel Vivanco, stated as much when he told the press just a few days after its publication, "We did the report because we wanted to demonstrate to the world that Venezuela is not a model for anyone…"[2]

Clearly Mr. Vivanco is entitled to his views about Venezuela, but such statements run counter to the mission of Human Rights Watch and indeed any organization dedicated to the defense of human rights. By publishing such a grossly flawed report, and acknowledging a political motivation in doing so, Mr. Vivanco has undermined the credibility of an important human rights organization.

We do not make these charges lightly and we hope you will understand the seriousness of such grave errors in judgment. As scholars who specialize in Latin America, we rely on what are supposed to be independent, non-partisan organizations such as Human Rights Watch for factual information about human right abuses committed by governments and sometimes non-governmental actors. So do many other constituencies, including the press, government officials, and the public. It is a great loss to civil society when we can no longer trust a source such as Human Rights Watch to conduct an impartial investigation and draw conclusions based on verifiable facts.

The report makes sweeping allegations that are not backed up by supporting facts or in some cases even logical arguments. For example, the report's most important and prominent allegation is that "discrimination on political grounds has been a defining feature of the Chávez presidency." (p. 1) Yet the report does not show, or even attempt to show, that political discrimination either increased under the current government (as compared to past governments), or is more of a problem in Venezuela than in any other country in the world.

What is the evidence offered for such a broad generalization?

"In most cases, it was not possible to prove political discrimination-with rare exceptions, citizens were given no grounds at all for the actions taken-yet many were told informally that they were losing their jobs, contracts, or services for having signed the referendum petition [to recall President Chávez]. For example, in one case reported to Human Rights Watch, a 98-year-old woman was denied medicines that she had long received from a state development agency because, as her family was told by the program secretary, she had signed the referendum petition." (p.21) (Italics added).

Taking services first, the above paragraph refers to an allegation that one Venezuelan citizen was denied medicines for political reasons. Amazingly, this is the only alleged instance of discrimination in government services cited in the entire 230-page report. In other words, the Barrio Adentro program has provided health services to millions of poor Venezuelans each year since 2003, and the authors found one allegation (as reported to the authors in a phone conversation with the nephew of the alleged victim) of discrimination involving one person. On this basis the authors make the sweeping generalization that "Citizens who exercised their right to call for the referendum-invoking one of the new participatory mechanisms championed by Chávez during the drafting of the 1999 Constitution-were threatened with retaliation and blacklisted from some government jobs and services." (p. 10, italics added).

This is outrageous and completely indefensible. We do not expect a report of this nature to adhere to rigorous academic standards, but there have to be some standards.

With regard to employment, there is no doubt that there were cases where individual government officials discriminated on the grounds of employees' political beliefs. (There were also cases of discrimination and firing of pro-government employees in the private sector, which the report mentions in a parenthesis (p.10) and does not investigate). However, the report does not show that there was any organized or systematic effort to purge the government of anti-government employees. Indeed, as anyone who is familiar with the government of Venezuela knows, after nearly ten years since the election of President Hugo Chávez, the civil service is still loaded with employees who are against the government.

The report does not demonstrate whether the firings that occurred, in both the public and private sector, were simply the result of individual actions in a highly polarized society in which the opposition spent at least four years (according to opposition leader Teodoro Petkoff)[3] trying to dislodge the government though a military overthrow. Indeed, it is not hard to imagine that many government officials would, in such a climate, be apprehensive about employing people who are against the government. The report does not consider this possible cause of observed discrimination. Of course this would not justify such discrimination, but neither would it support the sweeping allegations of this report, which attempts to argue that the government is using its control over employment in the public sector in order to repress political opposition.

Indeed, the report's most serious allegation of discrimination in employment concerns a case where discrimination was not based on political partisanship, but in regards to unlawful subversion that no government would, nor should tolerate: "In the aftermath of the oil strike, PDVSA purged its ranks of thousands of workers who participated in the strike." (p.29). But as anyone who was in Venezuela at the time can attest, this was quite openly a strike to topple the government, which the opposition had succeeded in doing less than eight months earlier. The oil strike devastated the economy - which lost 24 percent of GDP in the resulting recession -- and came close to achieving its goal a second time.

The report implies that public employees, in this case oil workers should have the right to strike for the overthrow of an elected government; we do not support that view. It is especially dubious when that group of employees makes up less than one percent of the labor force, and is using its control over a strategic resource - oil revenues made up nearly half of government revenues and 80 percent of export earnings -- to cripple the economy and thereby reverse the result of democratic elections. The view that such a strike is "a legitimate strike" is not, to our knowledge, held by any democratic government in the world.[4]

But most importantly with regard to the credibility of the HRW report, it is profoundly misleading for the authors to argue that "political discrimination is a defining feature" of a government that is not willing to risk the continuing employment of people who have carried out such a strike.

The report's overwhelming reliance for factual material on opposition sources of dubious reliability also undermines its credibility and makes it difficult for most readers to know which parts of the report are true and which aren't. The most cited source with regard to political discrimination is the newspaper El Universal.[5] This is not only a stridently opposition newspaper, it has also, for the years during which it is cited, repeatedly fabricated news stories. For example, in a typical fabrication of the type deployed to libel government officials, El Universal reported that then Interior Minister Jesse Chacón had purchased a painting for $140,000.[6] This turned out to be completely false. There are many examples of fabrications in El Universal, as well as other opposition sources cited by the report.[7]

We find it troubling that a report on Human Rights depends heavily on unreliable sources. Would a report on human rights in the United States be taken seriously if it relied so heavily on Fox News, or even worse The National Enquirer? Indeed, this report ventures even further into the zone of unreliable sources and cites a mentally unstable opposition blogger as a source. (p. 20, footnote 30). This is a person who indulges not only in routine fabrications and advocates the violent overthrow of the government, but also has publicly fantasized about killing his political enemies and dumping the bodies from helicopters into the slums, and torturing others by "pour[ing] melted silver into their eyes."[8]

A disturbing thing about the report's reliance on these sources is that it indicates a lack of familiarity with the subject matter, or perhaps worse, a deep political prejudice that allows the authors to see most of these sources as unproblematic. Indeed, there is only one passing indication that the newspapers El Universal and El Nacional, are opposition newspapers, and it is a reference to the past[9], which the reader might therefore reasonably judge to be irrelevant. On the other hand, the report refers to the newspaper Últimas Noticias as "largely sympathetic to Chávez and his government" and "a generally pro-government tabloid." (p.70, p.89) This is a newspaper that prints articles that are harshly critical of the government on a daily basis, and according to polling data in Venezuela is seen as vastly more independent than any other major newspapers. The authors' view of the Venezuelan media seems to mirror the view of the right-wing Venezuelan opposition, or the U.S. Right's view of the "liberal media" in the United States.

Such profound prejudice, in which events are interpreted overwhelmingly through the lens of Venezuela's right-wing opposition, is apparent throughout the document: for example when the authors describe groups that helped organize and supported the April 2002 coup as "new organizations dedicated to the defense of democracy and the rule of law." (p. 203).

But the worst thing about the report's reliance on opposition sources like El Universal, El Nacional, or Súmate, is that these sources have engaged in enough fabrications as to make them unreliable sources for factual material.

In its discussion of the media, the report also paints a grossly exaggerated picture of reality, while presenting some valid criticisms of existing law and practice. It is acknowledged in footnotes buried deep within the text that the opposition still dominates both broadcast and print media (footnote 184, p.74; footnote 181, p.73). Yet the government is reproached for "having significantly shifted the balance of the media in the government's favor" by creating pro-government TV stations since the 2002 coup, when "Chávez faced an almost entirely hostile private media." This is an odd position for a human rights organization to take. While it would be nice if the government could create TV stations that had no bias whatsoever, isn't it better to have some competition in the media - from left-leaning, pro-government stations - than to have a right-wing, anti-democratic, private monopoly? Especially when that right-wing monopoly had, as never before in world history, organized a military coup against a democratically elected government and led a devastating oil strike that nearly toppled the government a second time? Do the authors consider this type of media monopoly to be more protective of human rights than a media that is still dominated by the opposition but also presents some other sources of information?

The report refers repeatedly to the danger of "self-censorship," but does not provide any examples of this actually happening. This is a major weakness in its argument, since it is not that difficult to find examples of self-censorship in response to government pressure in, for example, the U.S. media.

In the 2004 U.S. Presidential election, the Sinclair Broadcast Group of Maryland, owner of the largest chain of television stations in the U.S., planned to show a documentary that accused candidate John Kerry of betraying American prisoners during the Vietnam War. The company ordered its 62 stations to show the film during prime-time hours just two weeks before the election. Nineteen Democratic senators sent a letter to the U.S. F.C.C. http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200410/101504.html calling for an investigation into this proposed intervention by Sinclair in the campaign, and some made public statements that Sinclair's broadcast license could be in jeopardy if it carried through with its plans. As a result of this pressure, Sinclair backed down and did not broadcast the film.

This example is directly relevant to the HRW report on Venezuela, because it shows that, in order to have a broadcast license in the United States and other democratic countries, the licensee is expected to follow certain rules and not to become a major political actor, e.g. by intervening in elections. As Vivanco himself has noted, "lack of renewal of the contract [broadcast license], per se, is not a free speech issue." Yet this report cites the denial of RCTV's broadcast license renewal as a simple, and indeed its primary, example of the Venezuelan government's alleged attack on free speech. It does not seem to matter to the authors that the station had participated in a military coup and other attempts to topple the government and would not receive a broadcast license in any democratic country.

The report even uses innuendo to imply that the government is to blame for attacks on journalists, which have occurred against both opposition and pro-government journalists. The authors state that the opposition TV station Globovisión "has received warning letters from CONATEL because of the political tone of its reporting, it has been frequently refused entry to government press conferences, and its reporters and cameramen have been physically attacked and threatened by Chávez supporters." (p. 117) The authors provide no evidence that the government in any way condoned or supported such alleged attacks.

The major media in Venezuela to this day are practically unmatched in this hemisphere, and indeed most of the world, for their vehement, unfettered, and even vicious, libelous, and violence inciting attacks on the government[10]. While the HRW report presents a number of valid criticisms of existing law and a few cases of unwarranted intervention by government officials, it serves no legitimate purpose to hide or distort the actual state of Venezuela's media.

The same can be said for the rest of the report, including its treatment of the judiciary.[11] HRW has an obligation to criticize any laws or practices of the Venezuelan government that it sees as endangering human rights, and we welcome the valid criticisms that it raises in its report. But Mr. Vivanco has gravely undermined the credibility of Human Rights Watch by producing a report that, by his own admission, is politically motivated, as well as grossly exaggerated, based on unreliable sources, and advertises broad and sweeping allegations that are unsupported by the evidence.

We therefore request that HRW retract and revise its report so as to produce a credible document. Mr. Vivanco should also retract his remarks as to the political motivation for the report.

We would be glad to meet with you to discuss this issue further, and would welcome a debate with Mr. Vivanco in any public forum of his choosing, should he be willing to defend his report in public.

We hope you will consider these requests with the seriousness they deserve. Our letter is not meant as a justification for the Venezuelan government's decision to expel the authors of the HRW report from the country. Human rights are too important to be used as a political football, as has so often been the case when Washington singles out another government as an enemy state. This is why we depend on civil society organizations for independent, non-partisan, non-political reporting and investigation.

In the spirit of sharing our concerns with our Spanish-speaking colleagues, we are having this letter translated to be circulated in Latin America.

Sincerely,

1. Rodolfo Acuña, Professor, Chicano/a Studies, California State University , Northridge

2. Federico Álvarez, Professor Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

3. Tim Anderson, Senior Lecturer in Political Economy, University of Sydney , Australia

4. Miguel Angel Herrera, Historia, Universidad de Costa Rica

5. Robert Austin, Ph.D, Honorary Fellow, School of Historical Studies, University of Melbourne

6. Márgara Averbach, Professor of Literatura, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

7. William Aviles, Associate Professor, Political Science University of Nebraska , Kearney

8. Mario Ayala, Programa de Historia Oral, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires

9. David Barkin, Profesor de Economía, Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana-Xochimilco

10. .Carlos Beas, Activista Movimiento Indígena, Oaxaca-MEXICO

11.. Alejandro Alvarez Béjar, Professor Economics Universidad Autónoma Nacional de México

12. Donald W, Bray, Professor Emeritus, California State University , Los Angeles

13. Marjorie Woodford Bray, Professor, Latin American Studies, California State University , Los Angeles

14. Charles Bergquist, Professor of History, University of Washington

15. Atilio A. Boron Director del PLED, Programa Latinoamericano de Educación a Distancia en Ciencias Sociales, Buenos Aires, Argentina

16. Chesa Boudin, Yale Law School

17. Clara Mantini Briggs, Associate Researcher, Demography, University of California , Berkeley

18. Charles Briggs, Professor Anthropology, University of California , Berkeley

19. Julia Buxton, Senior Research Fellow, Centre for International Cooperation and Security, Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University

20. Maria Emilia Caballero, Comitè ´68 Pro Libertades Democràticas en Mèxico

21. Marisol de la Cadena, Associate Professor of Anthropology, UC-Davis , CA

22. José Calderon, Professor Sociology and Chicano/a Studies, Pitzer College

23. Hernán Camarero, Professor, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

24. Cristina Castello, Poeta y Periodista, Buenos Aires, Argentina

25. Ana Esther Ceceña, Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas, UNAM

Observatorio Latinoamericano de Geopolítica

26. Eleonora Quijada Cervoni, School of Language Studies, The Australian National University

27. Julie A. Charlip, Professor, Department of History, Whitman College

28. Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Professor of Sociology and Women's Studies, California State University Long Beach

29. Christopher Clement, Visiting Professor Politics, Pomona College

30. Ron Chilcote, Professor Economics, University of California Riverside

31. Noam Chomsky, Professor of Linguistics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

32. Antonia Darder, Professor Educational Policy and Latino Studies, University of Illinois , Urbana-Champaign

33. Michael Derham, University of Northumbria , School of Arts and Social Sciences

34. Mônica Dias Martins, Professor Political Science, State University of Ceara , Brazil

35. Héctor Díaz-Polanco, Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología (CIESAS)

36.Luis Duno, Associate Professor of Hispanic Studies, Rice University , Houston , TX

37. Steve Ellner, Professor Political Science, University of Oriente , Venezuela

38. Arturo Escobar, Kenan Distinguished Professor of Anthropology, UNC-Chapel Hill , NC

39. Raul Fernandez, Professor, School of Social Science , University of California Irvine

40. Sujatha Fernandes, Queens College , City University of New York

41. Bill Fletcher, Jr., Executive Editor, BlackCommentator.com

42. Gabrielle Foreman, Visiting Distinguished Professor of Africana Studies, Bowdoin College

43. Cindy Forster, Associate Professor History, Scripps College

44. Félix Hernàndez Gamundi, Comitè ´68 Pro Libertades Democràticas en Mèxico

45. Raúl Alvarez Garìn, Comitè ´68 Pro Libertades Democràticas en Mèxico

46. José Francisco Gallardo Rodríguez, General Brigadier y Doctor en Administración Pública

47. Marco A. Gandásegui, (h) Professor, University of Panama

48. Lesley Gill, Professor and Chair of Anthropology, Vanderbilt University , Nashville , TN

49. Magdalena Gómez, Columnist, La Jornada

50. Gilbert Gonzalez, Professor School of Social Science, University of California , Irvine

51. Armando Gonzalez-Caban, Latin American Perspective

52. Jeffrey Gould, Professor of History, Indiana University .

53. Greg Grandin , Professor of History, Director of Graduate Studies, New York University

54. Angel Guerra, Journalist, La Jornada

55. Maria Guerra, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

56. Peter Hallward, Professor of Modern European Philosophy, Middlesex University , UK

57. Daniel Hellinger, Professor Political Science, Webster University

58. Ramona Hernandez, Director, CUNY Dominican Studies Institute & Professor of Sociology, The City College of New York

59. Derrick Hindery, Assistant Professor of International Studies and Geography, University of Oregon

60. Forrest Hylton, Ph.D. Candidate, History, NYU

61. Robin D. G. Kelley, Professor of History and American Studies

62. Misha Kokotovic, Associate Professor Department of Literature, UC San Diego

63. Maria Lagos, Associate Professor Emerita, Dept. of Anthropology, Lehman College , CUNY.

64. Sidney Lemelle, Professor of History, Pomona College

65. Deborah Levenson, Professor of History, Boston College

66. Nayar López Castellanos, Universidad Autónoma de la Ciudad de Mexico

67. Gilberto López y Rivas, Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, Centro Regional Morelos

68. Florencia E. Mallon, Julieta Kirkwood Professor of History, University of Wisconsin-Madison , WI

69. Luis Martin-Cabrera, Assistant Professor, UCSD

70. Jorge Mariscal, Professor, Literature, University of California , San Diego

71. Peter McLaren, Professor, Graduate School of Education and Information Studies, University of California , Los Angeles

72. Frida Modak, Chilean Journalist

73. Daniel Molina, Comitè ´68 Pro Libertades Democràticas en Mèxico

74. José Mollet, Profesor Asistente y escritor, Director del Centro de Investigaciones Socioculturales, Instituto de Cultura del Estado Falcón, Venezuela

75. Carlos Montemayor, Writer

76. Maricarmen Montes, Nuestra América

77. Josefina Morales, Investigadora UNAM, México

78. Luis Hernández Navarro, Journalist

79. Fabio Gabriel Nigra, Assistant Professor of History, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

80. Enrique Ochoa, Professor, Latin American Studies, California State University , Los Angeles

81. Elizabeth Oglesby, Department of Geography, University of Arizona

82. Jocelyn Olcott, Department of History, Duke University Press

83. Mercedes Olivera, Centro de Estudios Superiores de México y Centroamérica, Universidad de Ciencias y Artes de Chiapas.

84. Mark Overmyer -Velazquez, Associate Professor of History, University of Connecticut

85. José Herrera Peña Centro de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Facultad de Derecho y Ciencias Sociales, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo.

86. Rebeca Peralta, Nuestra América

87. Salvador E. Morales Pérez, Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo

88. Hector Perla, Assistant Professor Latin American and Latino Studies, University of California , Santa Cruz

89. John Pilger, journalist and documentary film maker

90. Deborah Poole, Professor, Anthropology, Johns Hopkins

91. Carlos Walter Porto Gonçalves Professor do Programa de Pós-graduação em Geografia da Universidade Federal Fluminense

92. Pablo A. Pozzi, Professor of History, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

93. Vijay Prashad, Professor, International Studies, Trinity College

94. Gerardo Renique, City College , City University of New York

95. William Robinson, Professor Sociology, University of California , Santa Barbara

96. Victor Rodriguez, Professor, Chicano Latino Studies, California State University , Long Beach

97. René Patricio Cardoso Ruiz, Director en Estudios Latinoamericanos, Investigador Nacional I del SIN, Facultad de Humanidades, Universidad Autónoma del Estado de México

98. Jan Rus, Latin American Perspectives

99. Emir Sader, Secretario Ejecutivo de CLACSO, Sociólogo, Argentina

100. Miguel Tinker Salas, Professor of History, Pomona College

101. Rosaura Sanchez, Professor, Literature, University of California , San Diego

102. John Saxe-Fernández, Essayist, México

103. Alejandro M. Schneider, Assistant Professor of History, Universidad Nacional de La Plata, Argentina

104. Enrique Semo, Professor of Economics, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

105. T.M. Scruggs, Associate Professor, Ethnomusicology

106. Jose Steinsleger, Mexican Writer and Journalist

107. Beatriz Stolowicz, Universidad Autónoma Xochimilco

108. Oliver Stone, Filmmaker

109. Sinclair Thomson, Professor History, New York University

110.Steven Topik, Professor, History, University of California , Irvine

111. Jorge Turner, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

112. Carolina Verduzco, Comitè ´68 Pro Libertades Democràticas en Mèxico

113. William H. Watkins, Professor, College of Education , Univ. of Illinois , Chicago

114. Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director, Center for Economic and Policy Research

115. Dr Stephen Wilkinson Assistant Director International Institute for the Study of Cuba London Metropolitan University

116. Gregory Wilpert, Ph.D, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, Brooklyn College

117. John Womack, Professor, History, Harvard

118. Nahirana Zambrano, Professor of American Studies, University of the Andes, Venezuela

###

[1]"Venezuela no es modelo para nadie," September 21, 2008, El Universal. Since El Universal is not necessarily a reliable source (see below), we confirmed that this quote from Mr. Vivanco was accurate.

[2]"Venezuela no es modelo para nadie," September 21, 2008, El Universal. Since El Universal is not necessarily a reliable source (see below), we confirmed that this quote from Mr. Vivanco was accurate.

[3] Petkoff describes the opposition "strategy that overtly sought a military takeover" from 1999-2003, and also writes about the opposition's use of its control over the oil industry to topple the government. "A Watershed Moment in Venezuela." Inter-American Dialogue Working Paper (July 2008)

[4] The United States has several laws that would have prevented such a strike from even having been carried out, and allowed for firing the participants and even jailing of its organizers.

[5] In addition to these opposition newspapers, the section on political discrimination cites extensively other opposition newspapers (El Nacional, Tal Cual) and the opposition group Súmate.

[6] http://www.eluniversal.com/2004/09/27/pol_art_chacon.shtml

[7] A few more examples: On August 4, 2004, El Universal ran a story on their front page that a recent poll showed the Yes vote against Chávez was winning and that there was "evidence that indicates the exit of Hugo Chávez as president." The poll turned out to be non-existent. Another opposition newspaper cited by HRW, El Nacional, has also fabricated stories in attempts to discredit the government. On January 12, 2003, El Nacional reported that an oil worker had been burned to death in an accident at El Palito oil refinery. On the day that the article ran, the reportedly "dead" worker appeared on television in good health. The HRW report also frequently cites the opposition group Súmate; Súmate maintained, on the basis of faked exit polls (for which it helped gather data), that the 2004 recall referendum was actually stolen by a fantastic electronic fraud. See "Polling and the Ballot in Venezuela www.cepr.net/documents/presentations/venezuela_polling.ppt . The opposition media in general promoted this bizarre conspiracy theory. (Chávez won the referendum, which was certified by international observers including the OAS and the Carter Center, by a margin of 58-41 percent).

[8] See http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/20…endsinlowplaces

[9] "Two long-established daily newspapers-El Universal and El Nacional-were persistent critics"(p.69)

[10] A recent example is when the Editor of the Newspaper El Nuevo Pais, Rafael Poleo, stated on Globovisión's talk show, Alo Ciudadano, that "Hugo is going to end up like Mussolini, hung with his head towards the floor." See

[11] For a more detailed but still not exhaustive account of the HRW report's exaggerations, errors, and omissions, see Gregory Wilpert, "Smoke and Mirrors: An Analysis of Human Rights Watch's Report on Venezuela" Venezuelanalysis.com October 17, 2008. http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/3882

http://www.commondreams.org/newswire/2008/12/17-2

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  • 3 weeks later...

Il fallait s'y attendre, après les gesticulations du gorille rouge contre Israël :

Synagogue in Venezuela vandalized

A group of people - reports run as high as 15 - broke into Caracas's Sephardic synagogue late on Friday, held the guard at gunpoint, wreaked havoc on the building and damaged the Torah scrolls.

Before leaving at around 3 a.m., the vandals scrawled "Death to the Jews" and "We don't want Jews here" on the synagogue's walls.

The damage was discovered by community members on Saturday morning. The guard was found on the floor, one community leader said.

[…]

http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid…icle%2FShowFull

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Venezuela behind on payments to oil contractors

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090206/ap_on_…venezuela_oil_1

CARACAS, Venezuela – Venezuela's state oil company is behind on billions in payments to private oil contractors from Oklahoma to Belarus, some of which have now stopped work, even as President Hugo Chavez funnels more oil revenue to social programs.
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http://fr.news.yahoo.com/3/20090208/twl-ve…um-5c16fb8.html

Dimanche 8 février, 5h11

VENEZUELA, Caracas.

L'opposition refuse la présidence à vie au Venezuela.

Des dizaines de milliers de manifestants ont marché dans les rues de Caracas samedi pour s'opposer à un amendement constitutionnel qui permettrait au président Hugo Chavez de se représenter éternellement.

Brandissant le drapeau national, les opposants portaient aussi des lunettes décrivant les lettres "no" pour inviter la population à voter contre un texte qui supprime toutes limites à la réélection. Il sera soumis le 15 février au référendum, avec l'appui du président Chavez.

"Tout a empiré" note Yraiber Davila, un ingénieur en mécanique de 24 ans qui se plaint de la criminalité, du manque de services publics, et de la difficulté de devenir propriétaire quand l'inflation atteint 31%. "J'ai une fille de 10 ans et elle n'a jamais vu d'autre président" résume Davila.

Hugo Chavez, au pouvoir depuis 1998, avait déjà essayé en 2007 de balayer l'interdiction de se représenter au-delà de son actuel mandat, qui finit en 2012.

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C'est malin maintenant il y a un risque que Chavez tourne en dictateur; c'est vraiment malheureux, car on ne s'y attendait pas.

Tous les espoirs étaient permis.

Chavez était tellement sympa depuis le début. Et pas autoritaire.

Franchement c'est un accident.

Et puis ça va s'arranger.

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Tiens, Chavez expulse un méchant eurodéputé qui a osé dire qu'il était un dictateur. C'est vrai, c'est méchant, quoi.

http://www.rtlinfo.be/rtl/news/article/219…ez+de+dictateur

L'eurodéputé espagnol, Luis Herrero, a été expulsé vendredi soir du Venezuela après avoir traité le président Hugo Chavez de dictateur et critiqué le conseil national électoral, a annoncé le ministère des Affaires étrangères.

"L'eurodéputé Luis Herrero a été invité à quitter le pays, en application des instructions du pouvoir électoral et dans le respect habituel des droits de l'homme", a précisé le ministère dans un communiqué.

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Et quand le "non" l'emporte (alors que Chavie voulait un oui), que fait le grand démocrate ? Il fait revoter, bien sûr !

http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/artic…uJa9tcb2E62QOxw

Notons l'absence assourdissante de tout commentaire de la part des éternels offusqués de la politique européenne de Sarkozy qui avaient, justement, reproché amèrement à ce dernier de vouloir faire revoter les Irlandais.

Ah oui, j'oubliais : quand Sarko le fait, c'est antidémocratique (et je suis d'accord). Et quand Chavie le fait, c'est … normal : c'est la démocratie en marche, les enfants.

Youkaïdi & Youkaïda.

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Telling Venezuela how to vote

Hugo Chávez is abusing the resources of his petrostate to fund a campaign to ensure his presidential term is extended

o Francisco Toro

On Sunday, for the second time in 15 months, Venezuelans head to the polls to vote on ending presidential term limits, potentially allowing Hugo Chávez to remain in power for life. The idea was defeated in 2007, but El Comandante is graciously giving the people a second chance to get the answer right.

The outcome is anybody's guess. Just two months ago, polls showed large majorities opposed the proposal, but that gap has vanished in the wake of a brazenly illegal campaign that has enlisted all the resources of the Venezuelan petrostate on the side of the government.

The litany of abuses is long: "Vote Si" propaganda decorates public spaces ranging from schools, hospitals and state government offices to Venezuela's

tax-collecting agency, the national worker re-training institute, the state-owned steelmaker and the seat of the National Assembly itself. Nearly every government website sports a "Si" banner ad. State-owned electric utility crews are tasked with putting up "Si" signs. Civil servants are strong-armed into "volunteering" and raising funds for the Si campaign. The 11 state-owned TV channels and the literally hundreds of pro-government radio stations broadcast "Si" propaganda round the clock. Nothing is off-limits. "Si" messages get piped into the Caracas Metro over the tannoy. The government even sees the referendum question itself as an appropriate setting for a spot of campaigning: the rambling, 77-word question echoes Si campaign themes with language about "broadening people's political rights", but never mentions term limits at all.

Perhaps most worrying is that PDVSA, Venezuela's state-owned oil giant, is now in on the game. In January, a massive convoy of PDVSA tanker-trucks paraded through the streets of Caracas, decked out in "Si" propaganda. Cars parked at PDVSA parking lots have their windows decorated with "Si"s in big white letters, whether the driver likes it or not. Reuters reports that on a recent visit to the energy ministry, one oil industry executive found the building nearly empty: the civil servants had been "voluntarily" marched off to a "Si" rally. And those are just the abuses I could easily document with links!

In effect, Chávez has turned the Venezuelan state itself into an appendage of the Si campaign.

The use of state resources for party political purposes is both illegal and unconstitutional in Venezuela. But with die-hard Chávez loyalists installed in every key post in the state – and, notably, throughout the court system – no institution is able to check these abuses. The collapse of the separation of powers leaves the government with a free hand to flout legal and constitutional norms that, ironically, chavistas themselves drafted less than a decade ago.

The government campaign is centred on a simple message: Voting "Si" does not mean making Chávez president for life. It means giving the people the chance to re-elect him as many times as they want. The proposal would expand people's political rights, they say, by removing an arbitrary restriction on their choice of candidates. Voters will always get the final say, through free and fair elections.

It's an argument that refutes itself. The massive abuse of state resources we've already seen tells us all we need to know about how fair those future elections would be. In addition to the natural advantages of incumbency, Chávez's perpetual re-election bids would be able to leverage all the resources at the disposal of the overwhelmingly dominant power centre in Venezuelan society today: the petrostate itself.

Where there are no checks on the abuse of state resources for partisan advantage, elections can't be fair. And where elections are not fair, their results can't be democratic.

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Bon, ça a marché ce coup-ci, Chavez est désormais rééligible à vie.

Coming to terms with Chávez

Now that the constitution is no longer a constraint, will elections be enough to defend against despotism in Venezuela?

Comments (…)

* Maxwell A Cameron

By scrapping presidential term limits, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez has eliminated one of the last hard constraints on his power.

Latin American presidents often act like dictators while in power, riding roughshod (pdf) over congresses, courts, and their political opponents. Presidential power is limited only by rules that define their terms in office – how many years until the next election, and how many times they can run – and by their ability to win elections.

Of course, leaders have often attempted to get around even these rules, often by changing the constitution or manipulating election results.

Alberto Fujimori discarded Peru's constitution to allow his own re-election in 1995. He even violated his own tailor-made constitution by running for a third term in 2000.

A new constitution in Bolivia, approved in a referendum on 25 January 2009, will enable President Evo Morales to run for another term. A similar referendum in Ecuador last year will enable President Rafael Correa to run for two more terms.

And Sunday's referendum in Venezuela is the second attempt by Chávez to change the constitution to allow indefinite re-election; an earlier referendum in 2007 failed.

Presidential re-election is controversial for reasons of both history and institutional design. Historically, Latin American political leaders have tended to concentrate great power in the hands of the executive branch of government. Repeated military interventions in politics throughout the 20th century reinforced the tendency toward overweening executives.

A habit of continuity (the term in Spanish is continuismo) developed, in which leaders sought to monopolise all powers while in office. In response, a taboo on re-election emerged. Mexican revolutionaries demanded "effective suffrage and no re-election". (For more analysis, there is a good examination of the history of re-election by Peter Smith in his book Democracy in Latin America.)

Under the 1917 constitution, Mexican presidents became demigods while in power, but once their term expired they were expected to retreat quietly into private life to enjoy their substantial fortunes.

Term limits also reflect imperatives of institutional design. Presidential systems were designed to create checks and balances that would ensure no one branch of government would become all-powerful, yet they have proven woefully incapable of restraining executive power.

Presidential systems create rigidities and conflicts that are often resolved ignoring the constitution altogether.

When the constitution is no longer a hard constraint on politics, the last defence against despotism is, of course, elections. Perhaps that is enough.

Chávez's supporters insist that if the Venezuelan people don't like him, they can vote him out of office in 2012. And if they want him, why should voters be denied the opportunity to keep a popular leader in office?

Some voters take Chávez at his word when he says he wants re-election not to give himself more power but to give more power to the people. "With Chávez, the people rule" goes his mantra.

Chávez has benefited from the belief that he cares about the poor. Many of the other democratic governments in the region – which includes some of the most unequal societies in the world – have done more to guarantee the interests of political, economic and military elites than to improve the lives of the majority.

Chávez's victory shows the broad support for his political project, but it also reveals that much of the public sees his continuity in power as the essential guarantor of that project.

Again and again, his supporters express the view that they need Chávez in power to continue to receive the benefits of the Bolivarian revolution. Unawares, they make a covert criticism: Chávez has not institutionalised his revolution. He has created a highly personalistic regime that depends on his leadership.

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